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likely to quit. More generally, both relative wages and external
shocks are found to be an important determinant of turnover
behaviour. The public policy implications of these findings are
discussed.I Introduction
The operation of the public sector labour mar-
ket plays a major part in determining the effi-
ciency and scope of government activity. Interest
in this issue has been heightened by a renewed
commitment by governments to the effective
organisation and delivery of public services, par-
ticularly in the health and education sectors.1Furthermore, the OECD (1999) has identified a
number of challenges in making the pub-
lic sector an effective ‘employer of choice’ in
the contemporary labour market. Amongst the
most important of these challenges are recruit-
ment and retention problems, giving rise to
critical skill shortages in occupations, such as
nursing and teaching (Belfield & Marsden,
2006).
Despite these policy demands, there is rela-
tively little known about the operation of public
sector labour markets. Of those studies that do
exist, the majority analyse the public–private
sector wage differential (Borland & Gregory,
1999), or turnover amongst specific occupational
groups, such as nurses and teachers (Imazeki,
2005). Relatively few studies investigate turn-
over rates for the whole sector. An exception is
Borjas (2003), but his focus is on the effect of
relative wage compression in the US public sec-
tor on the recruitment and retention of high-skill
workers. Similar work has been conducted by
Nickell and Quintini (2002) for the UK and Kim
(1999) for the USA, who find that the rela-
tive pay of public sector workers has fallen,
244 ECONOMIC RECORD JUNEespecially amongst civil servants, teachers and
nurses, which partly explains the decline in the
average quality of these groups of workers.
Harris and Adams (2007) provide evidence that
teacher turnover in the USA is not higher than
that of comparable professions.
Specific studies of nurses and teachers offer
conflicting results on the impact of relative
wages on turnover. Dolton and van der Klaauw
(1995, 1999) show that relative wages are an
important explanation of teacher turnover.
Chevalier et al. (2007) demonstrate that UK
graduates have become progressively less likely
to choose to enter the teaching profession
because of their sensitivity to relative wages.
Similarly, Mont and Rees (1996) show for the
USA that higher salaries reduce turnover.
Relative wages and conditions of work would
therefore appear to be important determinants of
teacher turnover.
However, Stinebrickner (2002) finds that
teachers in the USA are not ‘lured’ away from
teaching by better-paid jobs. Instead, the major-
ity of exits from teaching are to ‘inactivity’, to
raise newborn children. Similarly, Shields and
Ward (2001) argue that relative pay has been
overemphasised in discussions of turnover
amongst nurses in the British public sector.
They find that dissatisfaction with promotion
and training opportunities have a stronger
impact on intentions to quit than workload and
pay. Ahlburg and Mahoney’s (1996) study of
US nurses and Frijters et al.’s (2004) study of
UK teachers also found that relative pay had a
limited impact on retention. Hence, the relation-
ship between outside factors and nurse, teacher
and more broadly public sector turnover remains
an open question.
The article addresses a number of issues.
First, what factors cause labour turnover
amongst public servants, and in particular, what
is the impact of relative wages, external shocks
and job status, such as the distinction between
permanent and temporary workers? Second, are
there differences in turnover behaviour between
teachers and nurses, on one hand, and the rest
of the public service on the other hand? Third,
are there variations in quitting and termination
behaviour? Finally, it examines the public pol-
icy implications of its findings.
We use administrative records for approxi-
mately 200,000 public sector workers across a
range of state government departments in
Queensland, Australia, to examine these ques-tions. In addressing these questions, we dis-
aggregate worker turnover into quits (i.e. a
voluntary exit) and terminations (i.e. an invol-
untary exit). Using these data, we estimate semi-
parametric competing risks duration models of
worker turnover, allow for time varying labour
market shocks and control for unobserved hetero-
geneity.
A major contribution of our article is that we
are able to paint a more complete picture of the
labour turnover issues facing the public sector
than has hitherto been possible. This results
from considering the public sector labour force
as a whole while retaining the ability to focus
on the specific areas of nurses and teachers
where much of the previous research has been
concentrated. Insofar as the Queensland public
sector is similar to the public sectors of other
states and countries, then our results can be
generalised.
II Data and Institutional Background
The size, structure and operation of Austra-
lia’s public sector labour market are most clo-
sely comparable to that of Canada, the UK and
the USA. Employment in the extended public
sector accounted for 18.7 per cent of total
employment, slightly lower than the mean level
of 20.5 per cent (see OECD, 1997). Compensa-
tion costs as a proportion of general government
consumption expenditure in Australia are closest
to the levels exhibited by the USA, UK, Canada
and the Netherlands. The public–private sector
wage differential of 1.25 for the period 1994–
1997 for Australia is in the upper range of
OECD estimates (OECD, 1997) and compares to
an OECD average of 1.18. In view of these
facts, we argue that the performance of Austra-
lia’s public sector is comparable to that of other
OECD countries.
Furthermore, the structure of Australia’s pub-
lic sector is similar to the US and Canadian sys-
tems, distributed across federal, state and local
levels of government. State governments
account for 65.8 per cent of all public sector
employees and have responsibility for core
services, such as education, health, emergency
services and law enforcement. The remaining
public sector employees work in the federal
government (23 per cent) and local government
(11.2 per cent). Time series data for Australia
indicate that federal public sector employment
as a proportion of total employment has been
falling steadily since the 1980s, largely as a 2012 The Economic Society of Australia
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from 30.9 per cent of the total employed work-
force in mid-1983 to 19.7 per cent at the end of
2001 (Borland & Gregory, 1999), which is also
consistent with the experience of other OECD
countries. Employment in the state and local
levels of government remained constant,
whereas employment in the private sector grew
at approximately 3.8 per cent per annum.
The data used in this study are based on the
administrative personnel records of the Queens-
land State Government. These data were col-
lected to facilitate human resource management
and are known as the Minimum Obligatory
Human Resources Information (MOHRI) data-
base. It represents the minimum level of human
resource information that the Queensland
Government’s 25 agencies are required to
collect and report to the central government
agency for industrial relations purposes. The
database holds information on approximately
200,000 public sector workers and in this study
refers to the calendar year for 2001.2 The main
advantage of our dataset is that it covers the
entire workforce, including ‘new’ and ‘experi-
enced’ workers.
The composition and characteristics of the
workforce, subdivided by contract type, are
reported in Table 1. Females are in the major-
ity, representing 63 per cent of the total work-
force, and there are clear differences in the
occupational distribution of employment for
men and women.3 Female employment is con-
centrated in advanced ⁄ intermediate clerical,
teaching and nursing, whereas males are more
likely to be employed in managerial, other pro-
fessional and associate professional jobs.4
Approximately 86 per cent of men and 83 per
cent of women are employed in permanent2 Our analysis is actually based on 177,519 work-
ers, which excludes casual workers because of their
very short employment tenure.
3 Occupation groups are derived from 1 digit ASCO
codes, equivalent to the US DOT codes. The excep-
tion is for the professional group, which is disaggre-
gated into Nurses, Teachers and Other Professionals
(see ABS (1997) Australian Standard Classification of
Occupations, 2nd edition, catalogue number 1220,
AGPS, and Canberra for more details).
4 Unfortunately, there is no education variable in
the MOHRI, however, the occupation data are detailed
and are likely to be highly correlated with the level of
education of the worker.
 2012 The Economic Society of Australiajobs, with the remainder employed on fixed-
term ⁄ temporary contracts. The occupational dis-
tribution of employment is similar for per-
manent and temporary workers for both males
and females, except in nursing for females and
associate professionals for males, where a sig-
nificantly higher proportion is employed on
permanent contracts. Note also the large pro-
portions of males and females employed on
temporary contracts in elementary clerical
jobs.
Importantly, MOHRI includes information on
whether a worker exits the public sector. This
we use to measure turnover, hence all exits in
this paper refer to workers leaving the public
sector (not, for instance, moving between public
sector departments). MOHRI also includes
information on why the worker left, which
includes quitting, termination (dismissal and
non-renewal ⁄ termination of contract) and a
range of other exits, such as retirement, death
and ill-health. The former two we use as our
measures of quitting and termination, respec-
tively.5 A shortcoming of MOHRI is that we do
not know anything about the destination of
workers, hence we do not know if quitting
workers left, for instance, for another (private
sector) job or simply became unemployed or
inactive.
The usefulness of the distinction between
employee-initiated (quits) and employer-initi-
ated (terminations) turnover has been a source
of debate in the literature (McLaughlin, 1991).
Whilst we do not add anything to this debate, in
subsequent results, we do find distinctive pat-
terns of quits and terminations for both perma-
nent and temporary workers. Furthermore,
statistical tests reject pooling of these two exit
types, which implies that there is a behavioural
distinction between quits and terminations, at
least in our institutional setting.
Turnover is higher for temporary workers,
which is perhaps unsurprising, although the
extent of the difference between them and perma-
nent workers is striking. The permanent public
sector labour force experienced a 1–4 per cent
overall turnover rate in 2001, depending on
whether exit from the sector was via a quit or a
termination, versus 7–16 per cent for the tempo-
rary workforce. The temporary workforce is also5 Note that in the subsequent duration analysis the
other exit types are treated as censored events.
TABLE 1
Workforce Characteristics by Contract Type, 2001
Permanent Temporary
Males Females Males Females
Personal characteristics
ATSI† 0.07 0.04 0.08 0.06
NESB‡ 0.08 0.07 0.06 0.05
Disabled 0.08 0.06 0.05 0.05
Age (years) 42.40 40.74 36.19 36.34
Wages and tenure
Wage rate ($ ⁄ h) 26.68 25.60 22.63 22.27
Tenure (years) 13.77 10.08 3.03 2.87
Occupational group
Managers 0.10 0.04 0.02 0.02
Professionals
Nurses 0.03 0.14 0.01 0.06
Teachers 0.13 0.25 0.17 0.24
Other professionals 0.20 0.12 0.29 0.18
Associate professionals 0.24 0.11 0.13 0.09
Intermediate craft 0.06 0.00 0.11 0.00
Advanced ⁄ intermediate clerical 0.13 0.28 0.16 0.32
Intermediate production 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.00
Elementary clerical 0.01 0.01 0.06 0.07
Labourer 0.07 0.05 0.05 0.02
Turnover rates
Quits 0.03 0.04 0.09 0.07
Terminations 0.01 0.01 0.16 0.16
Other§ 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02
Working conditions
Agency size– 28,855 48,153 30,723 40,733
Establishment size†† 1009 1147 917 863





Other professionals 0.079 0.098
Associate professionals 0.029 0.066
Intermediate craft 0.061 0.042
Advanced ⁄ intermediate clerical 0.038 0.097
Intermediate production 0.039 0.024
Elementary clerical 0.120 0.108
Labourer 0.068 0.061
Observations 56,697 93,207 9006 18,609
Notes: †Includes those who self-identify as originating from an Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islanders (ATSI) background.
‡Includes those who self-identify as originating from a Non-English Speaking Background (NESB). §Includes turnover due to:
ill-health retirement, age retirement, voluntary early retirement, death, and pension (paid by agency). –Calculated as average
number of employees per agency. ††Calculated as average number of workers per postcode area by agency. ‡‡Due to small cell
sizes for some occupations, we do not disaggregate occupational entry rates by contract status and gender.
246 ECONOMIC RECORD JUNEcharacterised by a high entry rate – approxi-
mately 37 per cent were new appointees in
2001.One possible conclusion from these findings is
that temporary contracts are used as a screening
device, to enable the employer to determine the 2012 The Economic Society of Australia
TABLE 2
Quits and Terminations by Workforce Characteristics, 2001
Quits Terminations Other
Male Female Male Female Male Female
Personal characteristics
ATSI 0.13 0.09 0.05 0.04 0.06 0.04
NESB 0.06 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.06 0.05
Disabled 0.12 0.15 0.07 0.07 0.13 0.12
Age (years) 38.70 36.24 39.09 36.70 47.25 47.34
Wages and tenure
Wage rate ($ ⁄ h) 23.53 21.07 24.70 23.44 25.72 22.78
Tenure (years) 6.93 5.38 5.77 3.33 15.52 11.97
Occupational group
Managers 0.07 0.05 0.06 0.02 0.11 0.03
Professionals
Nurses 0.04 0.14 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.05
Teachers 0.06 0.09 0.23 0.30 0.11 0.19
Other professionals 0.28 0.20 0.22 0.14 0.18 0.11
Associate professionals 0.17 0.11 0.13 0.10 0.22 0.10
Intermediate craft 0.13 0.01 0.05 0.00 0.03 0.00
Advanced ⁄ intermediate clerical 0.13 0.32 0.15 0.32 0.15 0.32
Intermediate production 0.02 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.05 0.01
Elementary clerical 0.03 0.04 0.07 0.08 0.02 0.06
Labourer 0.07 0.05 0.07 0.02 0.12 0.13
Working conditions
Agency size 23,581 34,299 26,488 34,851 22,609 36,821
Establishment size 783 919 592 589 647 593
Establishment sick rate 1.78 1.90 1.75 1.77 1.97 2.01
Observations 3024 5291 2305 4096 1018 1147
Notes: ATSI, Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islanders background; NESB, Non-English Speaking Background).
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the size of the workforce.6 This is further corrob-
orated when we disaggregate turnover by quits
and terminations.7 Temporary workers dominate
both groups, accounting for approximately 26–32
per cent of all quits and a massive 72–99 per cent
of terminations. Table 2 shows that it is workers
at the upper end of the occupational hierarchy
who have higher than average rates of quitting.
For example, female nurses account for 13 per
cent of the workforce (see Table 1) with a high
quit rate (14 per cent) and a low termination rate
(1 per cent). In contrast, the share of female
teachers in the sector is 25 per cent, with a lower6 An alternative supply-side explanation is that
workers are looking for temporary contracts as part of
a lifestyle choice or in conjunction with other activi-
ties such as study.
7 Where terminations cover dismissal and non-
renewal of contract.
 2012 The Economic Society of Australiaproportion of quitters (9 per cent) and a much
higher proportion of terminations (30 per cent).
These outcomes are partly explained by the dif-
ferent shares of temporary workers recruited to
these occupations. However, turnover rates are
also high for other professionals, associate pro-
fessionals, such as technicians, and advanced ⁄
intermediate clerical workers (Mangan, 2000).
III A Theoretical and Econometric Framework
A variety of theoretical models have been
developed to explain worker mobility, including
human capital and search ⁄matching models
(Flinn, 1986; Meitzen, 1986; Farber, 1994;
Jovanovic & Moffitt, 1990), which we use here
as a framework for understanding the mobility
decisions of public sector workers and to moti-
vate the econometric approach.
Matching models rely on the presence of
imperfect information and on the idea that job
matches are experience goods (see Jovanovic,
248 ECONOMIC RECORD JUNE1979). It is assumed that both jobs and workers
have heterogeneous productivities, and the prob-
lem for the employer is to optimally assign
workers to jobs. It is also assumed that employ-
ers can contract with workers on an individual
basis. Employers offer higher rewards for work-
ers who are regarded as ‘better’ matches, which
in the context of the public sector may occur
through promotion within the internal labour
market. Because of the difficulty of firing work-
ers once they are on permanent contracts,
especially in the public sector, employers may
use probationary periods, and more recently
temporary contracts, so that relatively unproduc-
tive workers can be released (Bishop, 1990;
Green & Leeves, 2004). However, the quantity
and quality of information about the worker and
the employer is likely to increase over time,
which gives rise to either optimal matches,
perhaps through job reassignment, or turnover.
Worker turnover in the public sector can be
viewed as a function of the expected quality of
the match between a worker-job pairing, l, which
varies by each pairing and through time, t; infor-
mation about a worker’s previous performance or
output, q; and the precision of the match, p(t).
Workers quit if the expected discounted benefits
of alternative offers, in terms of the wage or con-
tract status, for instance, exceed the expected dis-
counted direct and indirect costs of job changing.
An employer terminates employment if at time t
they found that lt < rt
e, the employer’s reserva-
tion utility or productivity level. It could also be
expected that a higher rate of quitting than termi-
nation is observed if workers learn more quickly
than employers about the quality of the match.
Nevertheless, quit and termination probabilities
decrease with job tenure because ‘mismatches’
are detected early. However, because of the need
to learn about the quality of the match, the asso-
ciated hazards are likely to be non-monotonic.
Specifically, it is expected that the baseline
hazard will initially increase and then flatten
once information about the quality of the match
has been observed by the worker and the firm.8 In8 It is worth noting that workers in the Queensland
public service can be employed on contracts of 3, 6 or
12 months, which are renewable over an indefinite
period, and permanent workers have a probationary
period of 13 months. One may therefore expect to
observe spikes in the hazard as employers (and work-
ers) are required to renew the contract in the light of
information revealed about the quality of the match.the case of temporary contracts in the public
sector, where there is greater uncertainty regard-
ing a worker’s productivity, and hence the quality
of the match, we would expect their baseline
hazard to be higher than that for permanent
workers.
From this we can formulate the following
hazard models:
hQ ¼ f ðlt; q; pðtÞÞ; ð1aÞ
hT ¼ f ðlt; q; pðtÞÞ: ð2aÞInformation about q is a function of worker
tenure, which we observe in our data and is
reflected in the shape of the baseline hazard. We
cannot observe lt, thus we proxy this by worker
characteristics (e.g. ethnic background, disabil-
ity), the working conditions (e.g. establishment
size and establishment sickness record) and the
occupation to which workers are assigned. It is
difficult to observe the precision of the match,
p(t). However, due to the difficulty in dismissing
permanent workers, temporary contracts are
more likely to be used where there is less cer-
tainty about the quality of the match.
So far we have assumed that worker turnover
is a function of a matching process internal to
the public sector, when in practice there may
also be external shocks arising in the labour market
or from government policy, which also result in
worker turnover. Public sector workers are
clearly exposed to public expenditure cuts, for
instance, but may also be exposed to events in
the external labour market, insofar as a high
local unemployment rate, for instance, will
encourage immobility because the external job
offer arrival rate falls. Higher relative wages
may also act as a pull factor, as suggested by
some of the previous literature. Equations (1a)
and (2a), therefore, need to be modified to
include the unemployment rate (ut), our proxy for
shocks, and the relative wage (wr):
hQ ¼ f ðlt; q; pðtÞ; ut;wrÞ; ð1bÞ
hT ¼ f ðlt; q; pðtÞ; ut;wrÞ: ð2bÞOur observed covariates are collected in a vec-
tor, x, however, it is possible that unobservable
differences between workers, such as motiva-
tion and attitudes to work, also affect their
mobility decision. This is allowed for in the econo-
metric modelling. 2012 The Economic Society of Australia
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behaviour of workers in the public sector as a
semi-Markov process with individuals entering
the sector either via a temporary contract (j = 1)
or a permanent contract (j = 2) and exiting
either by quitting (k = 1) or separating (k = 2).
Thus, we have two origin states and two reasons
for exit, or destination states, and all spells in
the public sector are assumed independent of
each other for simplicity. For spell i, tenure is
grouped into Di intervals (dl)1, dl], l = 1,...,Di
with d0 = 0.
9
Following Prentice and Gloeckler (1978), we
adopt a random effect discrete time representa-
tion of the continuous time competing risk
model so that the likelihood for spell i of type






 DGðvjk; rjkÞ; ð3Þ
where yijkl = 1 for a j to k transition in interval
l, and 0 otherwise. The probability of a jk tran-
sition in interval l (the discrete time hazard) is
given by
Prðyijkl ¼ 1 vijk
 Þ¼ hijklðvijkÞ
¼ 1 exp½ expðgijkðlÞþ vijkÞ;
ð4Þ
where gijkðlÞ ¼ logfKijkðdlÞKijkðdl  1Þg, Kijk dlð Þ ¼R dl
0 hijkðtÞ dt, and hijkðtÞ is the continuous time
hazard for leaving origin state j for destination k
at duration t. G(vjk; rjk) is the distribution func-
tion for the unobserved heterogeneity, or ran-
dom effects (vijk), and has dispersion parameter
rjk. In this article, we model the unobserved
heterogeneity using normal mixing with mean
zero and variance rjk.
109 In our data, we observe the date started in the
public sector and the date they exit. This is divided
into two monthly intervals, except for workers with
very long tenures where it is grouped in year bands.
10 Several alternatives to using Gaussian mixing
exist, such as the gamma distribution and the non-
parametric mass point approach suggested by Heck-
man and Singer (1984). The non-parametric approach
is the least the restrictive, however, when we adopted
this approach our models did not converge.
 2012 The Economic Society of AustraliaUnder the proportional hazard assumption
gijkðlÞ ¼ b0jk þ b1jkxijkl þ wjkl; ð5Þ
where xijkl is a vector of covariates, some of
which vary over time (l), b1jk is a vector of
regression parameters and the wjkl are constants,
such that
wjkl ¼ logfK0jkðdlÞ  K0jkðdlÞg; ð6Þ
K0jkðdlÞ is the integrated baseline hazard. The
start and end points used to determine wjkl often
take different values to those of the time inter-
vals ðdl1; dl: When this happens we can write
wjkl = cjklI(l); I(l) is an indicator of the form
I(r < l £ m), where r and m are the start and end
points of an interval for duration.
This equation is estimated separately for each
origin-destination pair, jk, which means that we
assume that the hazards for each competing risk
are mutually independent. This implies that the
spell specific random effects (vijk) are uncorre-
lated across the origin-destination pairs.
The difficulty in interpreting the coefficients
from a competing risks model is well docu-
mented (Lancaster, 1990; Thomas, 1996), there-
fore to aid interpretation, we compute marginal
effects following the approach suggested by
Thomas (1996), which is discussed in some
length in Andrews et al. (2002). Thus, in our
empirical analysis, we report the estimated mar-
ginal effects and the probability value associ-
ated with the estimated coefficient obtained
from the competing risk model. Marginal effects
must sum to zero. Note that, although the hazard
of exit varies over person-time, implying varia-
tion in the marginal effects, we estimate mean
expected waiting times and then compute the
marginal effects of the covariates at this point,
that is, at j = 16 for males and j = 18 for
females. As these marginal effects sum to zero,
and we have two exit states, for brevity only the
marginal effects for quits are reported.
IV Results
As a point of comparison, Figure 1 presents
the estimated baseline hazard for overall turn-
over. In Figures 2 and 3, we report the esti-
mated baseline hazards disaggregated by type of
turnover. In the case of quits (see Fig. 2a–c),
there is very little difference between the shape
of the baseline hazard for permanent workers
(Fig. 2b) and all quits (Fig. 2a), most likely
because there are relatively few permanent
































































Baseline Hazards for Combined Destinations. (a) Permanent and Temporary Contracts Combined.
(b) Permanent Contracts. (c) Temporary Contracts.
250 ECONOMIC RECORD JUNE
 2012 The Economic Society of Australia






































































Baseline Hazards for Quits. (a) Permanent and Temporary Contracts Combined. (b) Permanent Contracts.
(c) Temporary Contracts.
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Baseline Hazards for Separations. (a) Permanent and Temporary Contracts Combined. (b) Permanent Contracts.
(c) Temporary Contracts.
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WAGES, SHOCKS, AND THE PUBLIC SECTOR 253workers who quit. Furthermore, once allowance
is made for unobserved heterogeneity amongst
workers, the quitting hazard for permanent
workers is flat. The main difference occurs
between temporary workers who quit (Fig. 2c)
and all quits (Fig. 2a). However, once again
controlling for unobserved heterogeneity results
in the hazard of exit for temporary workers who
quit becoming flat.
A different picture emerges for workers
whose contracts are terminated (see Fig. 3a–c).
Combining workers on permanent and tempo-
rary contracts (Fig. 3a), we observe that for
males and females the hazards of exit from the
homogenous models are initially high, fall and
then exhibit a spike at 12 months. This picture
is essentially replicated for males once unob-
served heterogeneity is taken into account,
although the hazard does shift downwards,
whereas the equivalent hazard for females is
flat. Disaggregating by contract status we see
that it is temporary workers who drive the pat-
tern of behaviour observed in Figure 3(a).
Our theoretical framework suggests that the
hazard to quitting will be higher than the hazard
to separation. Furthermore, the baseline hazards
for workers on temporary contracts should be
higher than those for workers on permanent con-
tracts if temporary workers are more imprecisely
matched. Since it is difficult to compare the
baseline hazards on Figures 2 and 3, due to the
fact that they have different scales, Figure 4
reports transition intensities by gender.11 For
males and females, workers on temporary con-
tracts are more likely to exit the public sector,
overwhelmingly through termination. In the case
of males on temporary contracts who exit invol-
untarily, there is some evidence that employers
take time to learn about the quality of the match.
This is reflected by the non-monotonic but rising
transition intensity up to 20 months. It is diffi-
cult to see any difference between the other tran-
sition intensities; therefore Figure 5 omits the
schedule for temporary worker terminations. Of
the three remaining groups, males exiting from
the public sector are more likely to occur
amongst workers on temporary contracts who11 Transition intensities are computed by re-scaling
the hazards so that they sum to 1 in each time inter-
val. Since all of our models are estimated with the
same number of time periods, are specified identi-
cally, and are estimated independently, we are able to
combine models in this way.
 2012 The Economic Society of Australiaquit, followed by those on permanent contracts
who separate. For females, the reverse holds in
the first few months, but from 12 months tempo-
rary quits are greater than permanent termina-
tions. In the case of both males and females,
permanent workers are less likely to quit.
In summary, we find evidence of non-mono-
tonic hazards for males on permanent contracts
and for temporary workers, even after allowance
is made for unobserved heterogeneity. We also
find evidence of spikes at 12 and 24 months,
followed by a flat hazard, which corresponds
more closely with an institutional rules-based
approach to employee screening rather than a
matching approach. Moreover, although tempo-
rary workers are more likely to exit the sector
than permanent workers, as our theoretical
framework suggests, terminations dominate
quits, which implies that this group of workers
is used as a buffer to external shocks.
(i) The Effect of Relative Wages and External
Shocks
If the size of the public sector workforce does
now respond to the business cycle, then termina-
tions should be pro-cyclical. Alternatively, if
governments use the public sector as a vehicle
for achieving their objectives with respect to
affirmative action then terminations may be
counter-cyclical. With respect to quits, as better
(and more highly paid) external job opportuni-
ties become scarce we would expect quits to fall
and hence be counter-cyclical.
We test these hypotheses by incorporating into
our models the time varying local unemployment
rate.12 Tables 3 and 4 show that, except for
females on temporary contracts, a higher local
unemployment rate is associated with an increase
in terminations, which is a counter-cyclical
effect, and a decrease in quitting, a pro-cyclical
effect. The finding that quits are pro-cyclical is in
line with existing evidence (see Contini & Ravel-
li, 1997 for an overview), whereas the counter-
cyclical termination effect is new.
To capture the attractiveness of alternative
job matches outside of the public sector, and
following the existing literature with respect to
teachers and nurses, we include a non-time12 Specifically, we map to each worker’s tenure in
the sector the quarterly unemployment rate at the
Statistical Local Area level, which encompasses
several local government areas.
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TABLE 3
Estimated Marginal Effects for Competing Risk Models, Females (with Heterogeneity)








ATSI 0.294 0.000 0.171 0.000 0.090 0.000
NESB )0.004 0.000 )0.006 0.100 )0.038 0.000
Disability 0.224 0.000 0.300 0.000 0.090 0.000
Managers )0.189 0.467 )0.084 0.000 0.119 0.000
Nurses 0.385 0.000 0.354 0.000 0.094 0.277
Teachers )0.569 0.000 0.081 0.000 )0.378 0.000
Other professional )0.051 0.000 )0.116 0.000 0.017 0.031
Associate professional )0.266 0.336 )0.485 0.862 0.034 0.188
Intermediate craft )0.068 0.926 )0.393 0.396 0.199 0.005
Advanced clerical )0.230 0.024 )0.404 0.877 0.004 0.008
Intermediate production )0.313 0.116 )0.326 0.014 )0.099 0.774
Elementary clerical )0.310 0.000 )0.351 0.296 )0.033 0.001
Estalishment size 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Establishment sick 0.106 0.308 0.165 0.044 )0.002 0.000
Relative wage 0.184 0.000 1.178 0.000 )0.027 0.513
Ln(unemployment) )0.426 0.001 )0.072 0.000 )0.042 0.000
Individuals 111,816 93,207 18,609
Observations 2,069,876 1,864,650 205,226
Log (variance) 8.958 9.829 7.180
Log likelihood )32,043.1 )23,999.2 )7362.4
Notes: ATSI, Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islanders background; NESB, Non-English Speaking Background).
256 ECONOMIC RECORD JUNEvarying measure of the relative wage. We do
observe the wage paid to workers in the public
sector, and compute a measure of the relative
wage by first estimating an occupation-age earn-
ings profile for all workers using the Queensland
1996 Population Census. The coefficients from
this model are then used to generate a predicted
private sector weekly wage for all workers in
the public sector. Deflating by the Queensland
CPI series 5, we then derive the private ⁄ public
sector weekly wage. Our results for the relative
wage variable are broadly consistent with our
findings on the unemployment shock variable.
Workers on permanent contracts facing higher
relative wages are more likely to quit. This rela-
tionship is not apparent for females on tempo-
rary contracts.
(ii) Are Nurses and Teachers More Likely to
Quit?
Estimates on a number of covariates are
included in Tables 3 and 4, however, for brevity,
we eschew a discussion of many of them andfocus on the occupational differences in quit and
separation rates. It is clear that when we combine
permanent and temporary workers, nurses are
more likely to quit the profession and teachers
less likely than labourers (the omitted case), and
when compared to other professional workers in
the public sector. For females, all other occupa-
tional groups are less likely to quit, so making the
finding for nursing even more striking. For males,
the story is slightly more complicated insofar as
male nurses are not the only group to be more
likely to quit; intermediate craft and other profes-
sional workers also exhibit this behaviour. Never-
theless, the probability of quitting nursing is
much higher than for the other two groups.
Disaggregating by contract type also reveals a
more complex story with respect to the mobility
decisions of workers in different occupational
groups. Table 3 shows that it is permanent
female nurses who are more likely to quit rather
than temporary workers, however, this group is
still more likely to quit than suffer a termina-
tion. Female teachers on permanent contracts 2012 The Economic Society of Australia
TABLE 4
Estimated Marginal Effects for Competing Risks Models, Males (with Heterogeneity)








ATSI 0.272 0.000 0.217 0.000 0.038 0.000
NESB 0.054 0.263 0.045 0.749 )0.012 0.025
Disability 0.128 0.000 0.067 0.017 0.075 0.000
Managers )0.015 0.001 )0.042 0.197 0.003 0.143
Nurses 0.659 0.000 0.206 0.000 0.061 0.615
Teachers )0.295 0.000 0.361 0.019 )0.221 0.000
Other professional 0.116 0.033 )0.010 0.000 )0.008 0.001
Associate professional )0.009 0.000 )0.131 0.000 )0.015 0.000
Intermediate craft 0.159 0.021 0.315 0.001 0.007 0.054
Advanced clerical )0.077 0.002 )0.171 0.006 )0.014 0.017
Intermediate production )0.178 0.005 )0.291 0.085 )0.040 0.022
Elementary clerical )0.151 0.588 )0.201 0.794 )0.020 0.429
Establishment size 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Establishment sick 0.061 0.300 0.139 0.001 )0.011 0.000
Relative wage 0.202 0.000 0.541 0.000 0.000 0.004
Ln(unemployment) )0.168 0.000 )0.052 0.044 0.062 0.000
Individuals 65,701 56,697 9004
Observations 1,287,613 1,192,140 95,473
Log (variance) 2.772 5.196 9.427
Log likelihood )17,436.0 )13,008.5 )41,71.4
Notes: ATSI, Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islanders background; NESB, Non-English Speaking Background).
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WAGES, SHOCKS, AND THE PUBLIC SECTOR 257are also more likely to quit, which means that
our previous finding for teachers was driven by
contract status. In fact, female teachers on tem-
porary contracts are much less likely to suffer a
termination. A similar story arises for male
nurses and teachers. Finally, comparing the gen-
ders, female nurses are more likely to quit than
their male counterparts and, conversely, male
teachers are more likely to quit than their
female counterparts. Since both are female dom-
inated occupations, the finding for the nursing
profession appears particularly problematic.
Our observation of a higher probability of
quitting amongst nurses on permanent contracts
in particular is a cause for concern, and suggests
that the retention problem is very real. In theo-
retical terms, this behaviour may reflect their
low expected valuation of the quality of the
match, which could be driven by a number of
factors. First, nurses are in high demand in both
the private and overseas sectors, and although
wages are generally lower in the former, condi-
tions of service are better, and so they may be 2012 The Economic Society of Australialured out of the public sector. Second, in recent
years nurses have suffered from serious morale
problems, associated with gender discrimination
with respect to promotion prospects, and would
therefore be expected to have an increased prob-
ability of quitting (Pudney & Shields, 2000;
Shields & Ward, 2001; Shields & Wheatley
Price, 2002). The first and second arguments
could explain the high quit rates for males and
females. A third argument which might explain
the differential in quitting between male and
female nurses is the argument put forward by
Stinebrickner (2002), albeit with respect to US
teachers, that female nurses leave to start a fam-
ily. To investigate this hypothesis further, we
calculated the proportion of exits disaggregated
by age and gender. We found almost no differ-
ence in the proportion of exits between males
and females for the 25–35 age group, the period
in which child-bearing for females is most
likely, implying that leaving nursing for child-
rearing cannot explain the gender differential in
the turnover rate.
TABLE 5







Managers )0.167 0.050 0.055 0.041 0.491 0.035
Nurses )0.143 1.020 0.000 0.103 0.814 0.817
Teachers )0.295 0.257 0.000 0.077 0.295 0.000
Other professionals )0.024 0.237 0.000 0.038 0.257 0.028
Associate professionals )1.449 0.343 0.000 0.065 0.259 0.812
Intermediate craft na na
Advance ⁄ intermediate clerical )0.084 0.090 0.385 0.382 0.340 0.000
Intermediate production 0.206 1.167 0.030 )0.117 0.906 0.163
Elementary clerical 0.105 0.237 0.000 0.281 0.708 0.000
Quits
Managers 0.167 0.092 0.000 )0.041 0.332 0.010
Nurses 0.143 0.286 0.000 )0.103 0.203 0.023
Teachers 0.295 0.779 0.000 )0.077 0.257 0.771
Other professionals 0.024 0.239 0.000 )0.038 0.176 0.043
Associate professionals 1.449 0.277 0.000 )0.065 0.230 0.161
Intermediate craft 0.078 0.285 0.000 )0.071 0.329 0.000
Advanced ⁄ intermediate clerical 0.084 0.124 0.000 )0.382 0.195 0.101
Intermediate production )0.206 1.667 0.337 0.117 0.974 0.065
Elementary clerical )0.105 0.401 0.002 )0.281 0.654 0.009
Notes: Standard errors and P-values refer to the underlying coefficients.
258 ECONOMIC RECORD JUNEThe findings with respect to teachers are sur-
prising since, according to the 1996 Australian
Census, state school teachers in Queensland
earned approximately $90 per fortnight more than
their private school counterparts and state school
teachers have had significant pay increases since
then.13 However, the private schools typically
offer better working conditions, which could
attract public sector teachers. There may also be
the lure of work in other sectors of the econ-
omy. Nevertheless, what is clear from the
results is that the pay increases for public sector
teachers have not yet had the desired effect on
retention since teachers on permanent contracts
are more likely to quit. Furthermore, the fact
that quits from teaching are more likely amongst
males suggests that, in contrast to the findings
for the USA, family reasons are unlikely to be
the main contributor to quit decisions.13 For instance, Queensland teachers received a 14
per cent pay rise between 2000 and 2002, 5 per cent
in 2000 and the remainder in 2001 and 2002.The finding of different turnover patterns
between nurses and teachers is perhaps surprising
as they represent workforces which are in many
ways similar and face similar human resource
environments. They have both moved to graduate
entry, are characterised by a large degree of gov-
ernment monopsony power, are heavily feminised
and both have a significant reserve workforce.
The differences documented in our results may
reflect some unobserved variation in human
resource practices across the two groups. How-
ever, we are unable to find evidence of this and
the data do not allow us to explore this further.
(iii) Occupational Differences in the Effect of
Relative Wages and External Shocks
We turn now to a discussion of whether occu-
pational differences in mobility arise because of
their different responses to relative wages and
external shocks. To do this, we estimate sepa-
rate models for each occupational group, which
also allows the effect of the other control vari-
ables in the model to vary. The limitation of this
approach is that for some occupational groups 2012 The Economic Society of Australia
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WAGES, SHOCKS, AND THE PUBLIC SECTOR 259the number of exits is low, hence we are forced
to combine males and females and temporary
and permanent workers.14 However, we are still
able to offer some tentative evidence on the
effect of relative wages and external shocks on
quits and terminations for each occupational
group (see Table 5).
Higher relative wages have the expected
effect, they increase the risk of quitting in most
occupational groups, with particularly large
effects in occupations that have skills that are
more transferable to the private sector, that is,
managers, teachers and associate professionals.
Intermediate production and elementary clerical
workers, who are relatively unskilled, are more
likely to separate, an effect that is probably due
to there being a larger proportion of workers in
these occupational groups on temporary con-
tracts. Indeed, the coefficient on the ‘permanent’
variable in the models underpinning the results
for terminations in Table 5 is always large, neg-
ative and highly statistically significant, imply-
ing that temporary workers are used as a buffer
to possible wage shocks that may increase the
public sector wage bill.
A higher local unemployment rate reduces the
risk of quitting, however, there are some notice-
able differences in the responses of occupational
groups. For instance, clerical workers (advanced
through to elementary) are more likely to be
shaken out when unemployment rises, whereas
more highly skilled managerial and professional
workers do face a higher risk of separation, but
the effects are generally small. To see this, com-
pare the marginal effect for managers of 0.04
with that of advanced ⁄ intermediate clerical
workers of 0.38, a differential of 34 percentage
points. What this evidence suggests is that when
unemployment rises, ‘less skilled’ workers in
entry level jobs, who are also more likely to be
on temporary contracts, are released, whereas
‘highly skilled’ workers are hoarded. This
makes sense insofar as less skilled workers are
in greater supply in the labour market and can
always be recruited as and when they are
required. Conversely, highly skilled workers
have specific skills that are valuable to the14 A further issue is that there were convergence
difficulties with respect to standard errors for the mar-
ginal effects from these models. As a result Table 5
reports the standard errors for the underlying coeffi-
cient and the P-values refer to these.
 2012 The Economic Society of Australiapublic sector and they are in relatively scarce
supply in the labour market.
Whilst these results provide information on
how outside factors influence occupational turn-
over decisions, due to their pooled nature across
contract status they may obscure within occupa-
tion across contract variation. This seems poten-
tially unsatisfactory given the differences in
response by temporary and permanent workers
highlighted in Tables 3 and 4. Ideally, we
would re-estimate our models separately for
temporary and permanent contract workers.
However, due to small cell sizes, we are unable
to gain precise estimates from our duration
models at this level of disaggregation. Instead,
we re-estimated the models reported in Table 5
with the addition of an interaction term between
temporary contracts and both relative wages and
unemployment.
These estimates suggest that the across con-
tract variation in the response to outside factors
reported earlier is driven by higher skilled occu-
pations. For instance, there is no statistically
significant difference in the response of tempo-
rary and permanent workers to outside condi-
tions for those in craft, clerical, production
or labouring occupations. There is also no
contract-based variation for associate profes-
sionals. For the other groups, managers, teachers
and other professional temporary workers’ quit
behaviour is less sensitive to relative wage
movements. In all these cases, when the interac-
tion term is combined with the main effect, this
suggests that the quitting behaviour of tempo-
rary workers is unaffected by outside wages.
This is in line with the estimates reported in
Tables 3 and 4. The one outlier is nurses, for
whom temporary workers’ quitting behaviour is
even more (positively) responsive to relative
wages than permanent workers. In terms of quit-
ting and the unemployment rate, contract differ-
ences are only evident for managers and
associate professionals. In both of these cases,
the sign of the interaction effect is negative, and
the joint estimate is larger, negative (and statis-
tically different from zero) when compared to
those reported for the base model in Table 5.
Hence, temporary workers in these two occupa-
tional groups have a larger negative relationship
between the unemployment rate and quitting.
Looking at terminations, for other profession-
als and nurses there are differences in the
response of temporary workers to relative wages.
In both cases, the estimates of the interaction
260 ECONOMIC RECORD JUNEeffect are positive and significant, and the joint
effect is not statistically different from zero. Ter-
minations for temporary workers in these two
occupational groups are unresponsive to relative
wages. Finally, in terms of the unemployment
rate, temporary teachers’ termination is less
responsive but still positive and statistically sig-
nificant.
V Conclusion
The article asked a number of questions
regarding the role of external shocks, relative
wages and job status for turnover behaviour
amongst public servants. In doing so, the study
departed from past studies by analysing the
behaviour of all public sector workers before
examining the turnover of teachers and nurses.
It made a number of important findings.
First, in relation to turnover decisions in the
public sector as a whole, there is evidence that
this labour market is affected by both external
shocks (which runs counter to the conventional
view that the public sector labour market is an
insulated internal labour market) and relative
wages. Specifically, we find, a higher local
unemployment rate is associated with an
increase in terminations, a counter-cyclical
effect, and a decrease in voluntary quitting,
a pro-cyclical effect. Our results for the relative
wage variable are broadly consistent with our
findings on the unemployment shock variable.
Workers on permanent contracts facing higher
relative wages are the most likely to quit within
the public service, except for males on tempo-
rary contracts.
In contrast to Harris and Adams (2007), we
find that nurses and teachers on permanent con-
tracts are more likely to quit the public sector,
compared to other occupational groups, but
there are gender differences in the propensity to
quit. The impact of job status also varies across
occupations. Teachers on temporary contracts
are more likely to separate, whereas nurses on
temporary contracts are more likely to quit.
Most other occupational groups of workers sepa-
rate, and, in contrast to the existing literature,
we show that those who do exit the public
sector also have substantial work experience; a
further correction to the standard internal labour
market theory which argues that workers maxi-
mise rent on experience by staying within their
organisation.
We do find evidence of non-monotonic haz-
ards for males on permanent contracts and fortemporary workers, even after allowance is
made for unobserved heterogeneity. However,
rather than observing a rising hazard, which
then falls and becomes constant, in the public
sector, we find evidence of spikes at 12 and
24 months, followed by a flat hazard. This
reflects institutional arrangements in the Austra-
lian public sector. As predicted, temporary
workers are more likely to exit the sector than
permanent workers; however, terminations dom-
inate quits, which is contrary to the predictions
of the model.
The above results have some important impli-
cations for public policy regarding the labour
force management of public servants, particu-
larly nurses and teachers. The traditional view
that higher skilled public servants were risk
averse, traded conditions for wages and were
isolated from external shocks is difficult to sup-
port from our findings. Specifically, we differ
from the conclusions of Stinebrickner (2002)
and find that permanent public servants, parti-
cularly teachers and nurses, are influenced by
relative wages in their quitting decisions.
However, in some part, their behaviour may
be influenced by the increasing propensity of
governments to hire temporary workers and to
terminate these workers in the face of external
shocks. In other words, the stability of public
sector employment, at least for some workers,
from the demand side is now no longer as secure
as it previously was and this may be inducing
some supply side responses such as a loss of
loyalty and a greater willingness to explore job
offers from outside the public service.
If this is the case, public sector employers are
faced with an interesting dilemma. The turnover
decisions of public servants are influenced by a
complex mix of wages and conditions, however,
our results suggest that to increase the retention
of skilled workers such as nurses and teachers,
employers will need to pay more attention to
relative wages. Conversely, they may seek to
re-examine the strategic use of buffer stock
(temporary) labour to restore some of the attri-
butes of the traditional internal labour market
which played down relative wages and emphas-
ised stability of employment.REFERENCES
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